DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile

DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile

DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5)ballistic-missile
CountryπŸ‡¨πŸ‡³ China
OperatorPLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
In Service?
Cost/Hull$11M
First Commissioned2010
BuilderChina Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC)

Overview

The DF-21D is the world's first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) β€” the weapon that earned the nickname "carrier killer" and, more than any single system, crystallised Western anxiety about China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. A variant of the road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile family, the -D model adds a manoeuvring re-entry vehicle (MaRV) with a terminal seeker, giving a ballistic missile the previously unheard-of ability to hit a moving ship at sea after a hypersonic descent from space. The concept is as much about the kill chain as the missile. To strike a carrier roughly 1,500 km away, the PLA must first detect, identify and track it using over-the-horizon radar, satellites, submarines and aircraft, then pass targeting data to the launcher in near-real time, and finally have the MaRV's seeker reacquire the carrier in its final seconds against decoys and jamming. The missile is only the visible tip of a vast reconnaissance-strike complex; degrade any link in that chain and the threat degrades with it. Strategically, the DF-21D's value is coercive as much as kinetic. Its mere existence forces a U.S. carrier strike group to weigh operating inside the first island chain during a Taiwan or South China Sea crisis, complicating American power projection and buying the PLA time and space. It has since been joined and arguably eclipsed by the longer-range DF-26 "Guam killer" and by hypersonic glide vehicles like the DF-17, but the DF-21D remains the system that opened the era of land-based ballistic threats to ships. For an analyst, the DF-21D is the canonical A2/AD case study: a relatively cheap, mobile, hard-to-counter weapon whose effectiveness is genuinely contested β€” never tested against a defended carrier under wartime conditions β€” yet whose deterrent shadow already shapes U.S. and allied operational planning across the Pacific.

Deployment Map

EQUATORSOUTH CHINA SEAEAST CHINA SEAWESTERN PACIFIC
Typical operating areas

Home ports from known hull assignments. Operating areas reflect typical AORs β€” individual deployments will vary.

Timeline

CommissionVariantCombat useModernization
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
1991
DF-21 (CSS-5)
2006
DF-21C
2010
First commissioned
2010
DF-21D
2015
Combat event
2020
Combat event

Specifications

10.7m
Length
~1,500 km (ASBM variant)
Range
Conventional maneuverable re-entry vehicle (~600 kg)
Warhead
~Mach 10
Terminal Speed
Inertial + satellite mid-course; radar/optical terminal seeker
Guidance
Tens of metres (estimated)
Cep
Two-stage solid-fuel rocket
Propulsion
Road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)
Basing
Cold-launch from canister
Launch Mode

Doctrine & Employment

Role

Land-based anti-ship ballistic missile to threaten and deter hostile carrier strike groups approaching China's near seas.

Design Philosophy

Impose cost and risk on naval power projection cheaply, exploiting the asymmetry between a missile and a multi-billion-dollar carrier.

Employment

Dispersed mobile launchers fire on satellite/OTH cueing; the MaRV manoeuvres to strike a moving ship in its terminal phase.

Threat Context

The signature weapon of China's A2/AD strategy and the reason U.S. carrier operations inside the first island chain are now contested.

How to Compare

Read alongside the DF-26 and DF-17 as a layered, land-based reconnaissance-strike complex aimed at the sea.

Operational Patterns

Typical Deployment

Road-mobile TEL units dispersed and concealed inland; salvo launch on satellite/OTH cueing during a maritime crisis.

Typical Task Group

Networked with Yaogan ISR satellites, OTH-B radar, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft.

Readiness

Fielded since ~2010; complemented by DF-26 and DF-17.

Key Operating Areas

South China SeaEast China SeaWestern PacificPhilippine Sea

Peer Comparison Matrix

DF-26πŸ‡¨πŸ‡³ Chinasuccessor / heavier sibling
Compare β†’

DF-26 roughly doubles range to ~4,000 km ('Guam killer') with both land-attack and anti-ship roles.

Video angle: Carrier killer vs Guam killer β€” the reach of China's ASBMs.

3M22 ZirconπŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί Russiaalternative anti-ship concept

Zircon is a sea/air-launched hypersonic cruise missile, not a land-based ballistic weapon.

Video angle: Ballistic vs hypersonic-cruise paths to killing ships.

AGM-158C LRASMπŸ‡ΊπŸ‡Έ United StatesWestern counterpart
Compare β†’

LRASM is a stealthy subsonic air/ship-launched cruise missile with autonomous targeting β€” a very different anti-ship philosophy.

Video angle: Mass-and-speed vs stealth-and-autonomy in anti-ship warfare.

Combat History

2020-08

PLA fired DF-21D and DF-26 missiles into the South China Sea during exercises; U.S. officials reported a missile struck near or on a moving target ship.

First public indication the ASBM concept had been demonstrated against a manoeuvring maritime target.

2015-09

DF-21D publicly paraded in Beijing, officially confirming the anti-ship variant.

Open acknowledgement of a capability long assessed by Western analysts.

Known Vulnerabilities

Kill-chain dependency

Effectiveness hinges on detecting, tracking and continuously cueing a distant moving ship.

Context: Severing ISR or datalinks neutralises the weapon without intercepting it.

Mitigation: Redundant satellite, radar, sub and air sensors.

Terminal seeker vs countermeasures

The MaRV must reacquire the target against decoys, chaff, jamming and manoeuvre.

Context: Carrier groups can spoof or evade in the missile's final seconds.

Mitigation: Improved multi-mode seekers.

Unproven against a defended target

Never tested against a carrier with full Aegis/SM-3/SM-6 defences and EW.

Context: Real-world Pk is genuinely uncertain.

Mitigation: Saturation salvos with DF-26 and cruise missiles.

Variants

VariantDesignationYearsCountStatusKey Changes
DF-21 (CSS-5)β€”1991–—activeOriginal land-attack MRBM
DF-21Cβ€”2006–—activePrecision land-attack variant with terminal guidance
DF-21Dβ€”2010–—activeAnti-ship MaRV with terminal seeker β€” the 'carrier killer'

Modernization Programmes

Reconnaissance-strike integration

in-progressongoing

Tighter fusion of OTH radar, Yaogan satellites and UAVs to shorten the targeting cycle.

Impact: Kill-chain timeliness, not the missile itself, is the decisive variable.

Images

DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile

Frequently Asked

When was the first DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile commissioned?

The first DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile entered service in 2010.

Who builds the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile?

The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile is built by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC).

What variants of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile exist?

Known variants include: DF-21 (CSS-5), DF-21C, DF-21D.

How much does a DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile cost?

Unit cost is approximately $11M per hull.

Curated Research

essential

Authoritative range, basing and capability profile

reference

Variants and the ASBM concept

Watch DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile in Action

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